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Abstract 
Milton Friedman’s “The Methodology of Positive Economies” is still one 
of the most widely read pieces on economic methodology. One reason for 
this might be Friedman’s attractive proposal that economists use theories 
and hypotheses as pragmatic devices to summarize data and make 
predictions over the relevant range of observations. Logically, this should 
lead to a fair minded comparison among many contending theories. 
However, Friedman's actual examples and discussion of these examples 
raise a puzzle. The field of comparison seems unduly narrow from the 
beginning. In my attempt to resolve this, I consider some logical and 
ontological problems for Friedman's position. I end up by suggesting a 
scientific realist approach to testing theories by causal comparisons over a 
wide field of contending theories. 
 3 
1. Introduction 
 
 Milton Friedman’s “The Methodology of Positive Economics” was 
originally published in 1953. After more than fifty years it is still one of 
the most widely read pieces on economic methodology. Although 
criticisms abound, the basic framework is still widely accepted by most 
mainstream economists. 1  One reason for this might be Friedman’s 
attractive proposal that economists use theories and hypotheses as 
pragmatic devices to summarize data and make predictions over the 
relevant range of observations. 
 Indeed, at first glance, Friedman’s proposed approach seems practical, 
impartial and liberating. “[T]he only relevant test of the validity of a 
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience…The 
hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted (“frequently” or 
more often than predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted 
if its predictions are not contradicted; great confidence is attached to it if it 
has survived many opportunities for contradiction.  Factual evidence can 
never “prove” a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which is what 
we generally mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis 
has been “confirmed” by experience….The validity of a hypothesis in this 
sense is not by itself a sufficient criterion for choosing among alternative 
hypotheses…"2  
   Friedman continues helpfully, "… [o]bserved facts are necessarily 
finite in numbers, possible hypotheses infinite…The choice among 
alternative hypotheses equally consistent with the available evidence must 
to some extent be arbitrary, though there is general agreement that relevant 
considerations are suggested by the criteria ‘simplicity’ and ‘fruitfulness’, 
notions that defy completely objective specification.”3 Here, provisionally 
at least, Friedman seems to be open to considering a number of different 
hypotheses consistent with a given body of data. Although notions such as 
'simplicity' and 'fruitfulness' as Friedman himself notes are complex ideas, 
there is no indication at this point in his argument that these will stand in 
the way of being open-minded about hypotheses to consider. 
However, he goes on to add that ‘…to suppose that hypotheses have not 
only ‘implications’ but also ‘assumptions’ and that the conformity of these 
‘assumptions’ to ‘reality’ is a test of the validity of a hypothesis is 
fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief.” 4  Such 
anti-realism may also be interpreted as a plea for tolerance and good 
                                                       
1
 From my discussions with colleagues in political science and sociology, it seems that although 
the methodological debates in these fields are  quite lively, there are sympathetic practitioners if 
not strict  adherents in these fields as well 
2
 Friedman does not distinguish between theories and hypotheses. This can lead to some 
"mischief", to use Friedman's own locution. There is also a confusion about theories and models as 
well. On these distinctions see Khan (2003). 
3
 Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics ", in Essays in Positive Economics 
(Chicago; 1953), p. 8f, 10 and 14. 
4
 Ibid, p14. 
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empirical procedures for testing the hypotheses in light of their 
predictions. 
 Such an openness to considering empirical fit and predictive success 
could presumably lead to a consideration of several competing hypotheses 
and theoretical frameworks in the “market place for ideas” to use a 
metaphor economists love. However, Friedman ends up very quickly by 
advocating the familiar neoclassical assumption that economic agents 
behave as if they are able to maximize (utility, profit) subject to certain 
economic constraints. This poses an interesting puzzle. Why does 
Friedman’s initial position of seeming tolerance so quickly restrict itself to 
endorsing the status quo? To put it in somewhat provocative economics 
language, why does the possibility of a competitive marketplace for ideas 
approach the monopolistic market structure so rapidly? We can also ask 
whether Friedman's seemingly tolerant anti-realist position might have 
anything to do with this bias for the status quo. More precisely, does 
Friedman's seemingly tolerant anti-realism have a logical or axiological 
connection with his firm endorsement of the neoclassical maximizing of 
utility (or minimizing of cost) postulate?  The rest of this essay will 
attempt to answer these questions. 
 In what follows I first take up the idea of hypothesis testing without a 
realist bias. This is the best case scenario for an anti-realist. Next, I ask 
what leads to a limiting of alternatives under the best case scenario. 
Finally, I offer a well-hedged scientific realist argument for field-specific 
open examination of theoretical alternatives. It can be shown that such an 
openness requires a respect for well-confirmed theories if the science in 
question is mature enough. At the same time, imaginative alternatives that 
offer relatively more causal depth compared to the existing theories and 
elucidate important puzzles in the field need to be considered seriously by 
the social scientists in their specific areas of research 
 
2. The Best Case for Friedman’s Anti-Realism 
 
 Friedman proposes a seemingly straightforward test for accepting 
hypotheses. It is really a fit with data ultimately and an ability to predict 
better. Along the way, he gives an ingenious defense of the “as if” position 
of the Chicago school and argues convincingly against “behavioral” 
alternatives which would uphold more descriptive (but less economical) 
approaches to characterizing economic behavior. In the context of late 
1940s, the most prominent of these “behavioral” alternatives was the 
theory of the firm. 
 Friedman’s argument here rests on the claim that these rivals to the 
neoclassical theory of the firm used ad hoc assumptions and implied much 
less of the explananda than did the neoclassical theory of the firm. That is 
the best case scenario for Friedman. Given the menu from which Friedman 
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seemingly had to choose, the theoretical alternatives on offer were indeed 
poorer by comparison in spite of their claims for greater realism in their 
assumptions. 
 However, in his critique of these alternatives Friedman does not 
consider the tendencies of competitive markets to give rise to oligopoly or 
monopoly, or the problems of innovation in a perfectly competitive market. 
Even during the fifties there were at least two competing theories in these 
domains, namely the Schumpeterian theory of the innovating and 
creatively destructive firm and the closely related but clearly differentiated 
Marxian theory of extraction of relative surplus value at the point of 
production and capital accumulation in a classically competitive market 
system. The market structure of competitive capitalism in this theory gives 
rise to concentration. In fact, this is a striking prediction and thus this 
theory would seem to be a serious contender by Friedman's own criterion 
of predictive success. Both the theories have subsequently been refined.5 
But even in Friedman’s date of writing these would have been serious 
contenders by his own standards defended in his essay. 
 Friedman’s failure to consider useful and serious alternatives could be 
attributed to several factors ranging from the state of debate in the field 
which existed then (here Friedman was not alone in ignoring these 
theories) to Friedman’s training as a Chicago economist with a greater 
familiarity with and an acceptance of the neoclassical postulates. Indeed, 
Friedman wrote a number of insightful papers on Marshallian demand 
curve and other related neoclassical topics. However, his methodological 
position still remains puzzling. How could a well-trained economist of 
Friedman’s ability ignore two of the more serious contenders from a 
scientific view point in good conscience? More positively and importantly, 
how can the plea for tolerance become realized in the practice of the social 
scientists today? 
 
3.  (Lack of) Familiarity breeds conservatism 
 
 The key to answering the above question is in assessing the actual 
depth of existing theories in economics and by extension other social 
sciences and their actual state of empirical success. In economics, as in 
other social sciences, predictive success is conspicuous mostly by its 
absence. Although econometric techniques are continually being refined, 
testing hypotheses from a complex web of contaminated data is 
challenging at best. There are no constants in economics or other social 
sciences, as there are in physics or chemistry. Therefore, the key empirical 
relations keep changing over time. One of the most telling critiques (by 
Lucas) of  Keynesian macroeconomics produced by the neoclassical 
                                                       
5
 See for example Iwai(2001), Khan (2002) and James and Khan (1998) and the references cited in 
these. 
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synthesis of Hicks-Samuelson-Solow variety has been based precisely on 
the shifting of key parameters in economic models as agents anticipate 
changes in policy. 
 Thus Friedman and others fall back at the end on simple models that 
are familiar from training and field-specific professional socialization. 
Departures from the familiar principles of market   produce 
complications. The virtue of anti-realism in this context is also clear. The 
anti-realist does not claim that the theoretical concepts are true. In early 
twentieth century philosophy of science, Poincare's Science and 
Hypothesis (1903) is the classic defense of this position. 
 However, in physics failure to predict by one theory and predictive 
success of alternative theories can frequently lead, and historically has led, 
to theory changes. Even Poincare acknowledged the reality of molecules 
after Einstein’s characterization of Brownian motion within a 
kinetic-molecular theory of fluids was experimentally verified by Perrin 
and his associates. 
In case of economics the situation has actually become worse than it 
was in Friedman's youthful days when he penned his "Methodology" piece. 
A less exuberant Friedman laments without any sense of irony that 
“economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics 
rather than dealing with real economic problems” (Friedman, 1999, p.137; 
see also Leontief (1982), for an even earlier lamentation by a Nobel laureate 
about the state of economics without being able to pinpoint the causes); 
Another Nobel laureate Ronald Coase complains: “Existing economics is a 
theoretical system which floats in the air and which bears little relation to 
what happens in the real world” (Coase, 1999, p.2). A prominent game 
theorist ruefully remarks (Rubinstein, 1995, p.12):  
 
“The issue of interpreting economic theory is... the most serious problem 
now facing economic theorists. The feeling among many of us can be 
summarized as follows. Economic theory should deal with the real world. It 
is not a branch of abstract mathematics even though it utilizes mathematical 
tools. Since it is about the real world, people expect the theory to prove 
useful in achieving practical goals. But economic theory has not delivered 
the goods. Predictions from economic theory are not nearly as accurate as 
those by the natural sciences, and the link between economic theory and 
practical problems... is tenuous at best.”  
 
Rubinstein goes further:  
“Economic theory lacks a consensus as to its purpose and interpretation. 
Again and again, we find ourselves asking the question ‘where does it 
lead?’”  
 
 7 
The methodological problem extends beyond just the discipline's lack 
of direction and predictive power that turns out to be much more limited 
than Friedman's generation had believed. Honest econometricians despair 
about the divergence between econometric theory and empirical practice.  
Thus arises another lamentation from Leamer (1978, p.vi), a widely 
respected econometrician:  
 
“The opinion that econometric theory is largely irrelevant is held by an 
embarrassingly large share of the economics profession. The wide gap 
between econometric theory and econometric practice might be expected 
to cause professional tension. In fact, a calm equilibrium permeates our 
journals and our meetings. We comfortably divide ourselves into a celibate 
priesthood of statistical theorists, on the one hand, and a legion of 
inveterate sinner-data analysts, on the other. The priests are empowered to 
draw up lists of sins and are revered for the special talents they display. 
Sinners are not expected to avoid sins; they need only confess their errors 
openly.” 
 
 Given the lack of predictive success in economics as well as in other 
social sciences, Friedman’s methodology as well as the current practice of 
economists both tend to be biased towards the familiar. Friedman knows 
as a creative scientist that familiarity is field-specific and depends largely 
on early training and continuing socialization through career-building 
incentives, and hence the need for approval from more established 
colleagues within the field. He contrasts the approaches of neoclassical 
economists with the theoretical inclinations of sociologists in the 
following example: 
 
“Consider … the hypothesis that the extent of racial or religious 
discrimination in employment in a particular area or industry is related to 
the degree of monopoly in the area or industry in question… This 
hypothesis is for more likely to appeal to an economist than to a 
sociologist. It can be said to ‘assure’ single-minded pursuit of pecuniary 
self-interest by employers in competitive industries. And this ‘assumption’ 
works well in a wide variety of hypotheses in economics… It is therefore 
likely to seem reasonable to the economist that it may work in this case as 
well… [T]he background of the scientists is not irrelevant to the judgment 
they reach… [T]he weight of evidence…can never be assessed completely 
"
6
 (Emphasis mine) 
 
 Friedman’s admission and defense of this field-specific bias, together 
with the demonstrable lack of predictive success in economics and in other 
social sciences would seem to result in an impasse. If we follow Friedman 
                                                       
6
 Friedman, Ibid. p29 
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in practice and support familiarity then we do not seem to have any way to 
go beyond the neoclassical postulate in microeconomics and orthodox 
postulates in other social sciences. 
 Note that Friedman makes no claim about the truth-value of his 
neoclassical postulate. But in reality, we are to act as if the postulate is true. 
Therefore, there is an axiological connection with how an economist 
might correctly analyze specific modes of economic behavior. In case of 
Friedman's own school, this also led to specific policy positions as well. 
 
4. What then remains for the theorist to do? 
 
 Friedman’s own move is to use this anti-realism to make the diversity 
of frameworks irrelevant except in a very narrow professional way that 
shuns controversial theories often for ideological reasons and then offers a 
pseudo-philosophical justification for this practice. His dictum is to opt 
unambiguously for the familiar overall hypothesis. He could argue 
(although he does not) that choosing this familiar theory within which to 
work can efficiently allocate research time and facilitate collaboration.
 Although there are situations where sticking with the familiar can 
save us from crackpot theories and economize on scarce research time, it 
can be argued that the social sciences as a whole are not mature enough to 
require researching under the assumptions of only one theory without even 
bothering to test whether the theory is even approximately more true than 
other reasonable alternatives. In the present state of the social sciences, 
foreclosing alternatives too soon can only lead to an impoverished menu 
of alternative hypotheses. 
Before I move on to present an alternative methodology, let me 
quickly point out one strength of Friedman when compared with the 
logical positivist literature on explanation and prediction at the time of his 
writing. In the literature on the covering law model of explanation and 
prediction (these were taken to be symmetric in logical form) that was 
prevalent then, a great deal of effort was expended on defining the logical 
forms of explanation and prediction. According to this model, an adequate 
explanation of why something happened fit one of two patterns. For the 
sake of brevity, I will discuss only the first, non-statistical explanatory 
pattern here. 
In the first, "deductive-nomological pattern,” or D-N model, empirical 
general laws and statements of initial conditions are premises which 
jointly imply the statement that the event in question has occurred. 
Therefore, logically (not necessarily ontologically), it had to happen. 
In the illustration presented by  C. G. Hempen7, the thinker who 
probably developed the covering law model  in the greatest detail, with 
the greatest clarity and philosophical acumen: 
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 See for example, Hempel (1965) 
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Let the event to be explained consist in the cracking of an 
automobile radiator during a cold night. The sentences of group (1) 
[i.e., the "set of statements asserting the occurrence of' certain 
events . . . at certain times"] may state the following initial and 
boundary conditions: The car was left in the street all night. Its 
radiator, which consists of iron, was completely filled with water, 
and the lid was screwed on tightly. The temperature during the night 
dropped form 39°F, in the evening, to 25°F in the morning; the air 
pressure was normal. The bursting pressure of the radiator material is 
so and so much. Group (2) [i.e., the "set of universal hypotheses"] 
would contain empirical laws such as the following: Below 32°F, 
under normal atmospheric pressure, water freezes. Below 39.5°F, the 
pressure of a mass of water increases with decreasing- temperature, 
if the volume remains constant or decreases; when the water freezes, 
the pressure again increases. Finally, this group would have to 
include a quantitative law concerning the change of pressure of water 
as a function of its temperature and volume. From statements of 
these two kinds, the conclusion that the radiator cracked during the 
night can be deduced by logical reasoning; an explanation of the 
considered event has been established. 
 
 
 
This appealing approach taken entirely from physics and generalized 
to apply to all sciences has misled many generations of social scientists. 
The basic problem is that many perfectly good explanations in history, 
anthropology, sociology, political economy and related fields do not fit the 
D-N model even approximately. Even in the natural sciences geology and 
biology can offer explanations that are seriously discussed within the 
fields but also do not fit this model. 
It is to Friedman's credit that he stays away from putting explanations 
and predictions in such a logical straitjacket. His claim that predictions 
should be the ultimate arbiter also does not rest on any claim about the 
symmetry between the D-N model's explanatory scheme and predictions. 
Friedman has been accused of being an "instrumentalist" by commentators 
who want to label him according to the accepted terminology of 
philosophy of science developed during the great logical positivist debate.8 
While the label may not be inaccurate, whether or not Friedman fits some 
philosophy of science label better than others is largely irrelevant from the 
point of view of substantive research in social science. In fact, as Kevin 
                                                       
8
 However see Boland (1979) and Hirsch and de Marchi (1990) for a fair-minded 
treatment of Friedman on this issue. 
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Hoover and some others have noted, Friedman seems to have been both 
untutored in philosophy of science and an entirely original thinker who 
thought he had developed a pragmatic test for validity of theories and 
hypotheses based on predictive success alone.9 Although flawed in many 
ways, this was probably a better move than importing sterile philosophy of 
science terms and debates into economics and more broadly, the social 
sciences. While informed methodological discussion is valuable for its 
own sake and there are some excellent examples in economics10 and other 
social sciences, it is a regrettable fact that a mechanical application of 
trendy philosophy of science terms characterizes much methodological 
discussion even today. Quite predictably, this move has so far failed to 
advance the social sciences even methodologically, leaving alone any 
methodological aid towards making substantive progress in specific areas 
of controversy. From this perspective, in order to be fair to Friedman, it 
could be said Friedman's methodology fails on a higher ground than most 
methodologists today claim to succeed on. 
Friedman fails in mainly two broad areas. First, he does not consider 
enough options with regards to the menu of theories and hypotheses to be 
tested. Second, and equally important, he fails to consider criteria for 
testing other than predictive success which may point nevertheless to 
explanatory validity. Thus we can reformulate a criticism by Daniel 
Hammond (1991) of Friedman's argument so that it emphasizes this 
exclusionary aspect. According to Hammond, Friedman's argument is: 
 
1. A good hypothesis provides valid and meaningful predictions 
concerning the class of phenomena it is intended to explain. (Premise)  
2. The only test of whether a hypothesis is a good hypothesis is whether it 
provides valid and meaningful predictions concerning the class of 
phenomena it is intended to explain. (invalidly from 1)  
3. Any other facts about a hypothesis, including whether its assumptions 
                                                       
9
 Hoover (2004) goes even further and offers an intriguing argument that Friedman was a 
causal realist with evidence from Friedman's substantive scientific work. However, even 
Hoover is aware that the dominant interpretation of Friedman's methodological essay--- 
which certainly has influenced actual  practice of subsequent researchers--- is 
anti-realist. 
10
 See for example, Lawson(1997, 2003). In particular, the characterization by Lawson 
and others in the critical realist school of the task of methodologists as that of 
philosophical underlaborers is both sensible and modest. The scientific realist idea of 
causal comparison presented here owes much to Miller(1987) who also acknowledges his 
debt to earlier works. For example, Richard N. Boyd, "Realism, Underdetermination, and 
a Causal Theory of Evidence,"Nous (1973)pp . 1-12; Alvin I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory 
of Knowing,"Journal of Philosophy (1 967), pp. 355-72; and Gilbert Harman, "The 
Inference to the Best Explanation," Philosophical Review (1 965), pp. 88-95. But both 
Miller and I depart from certain generalizing and a prioristic tendencies of these works by 
stressing the role of particular debates in specific substantive areas of a particular science 
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are realistic, are irrelevant to its scientific assessment. (Trivially from 2) 
If (1) the criterion of a good theory is narrow predictive success, then 
surely (2) the test of a good theory is narrow predictive success, and 
Friedman's claim that the realism of assumptions is irrelevant follows 
trivially. This is a tempting and persuasive argument. 
But it is fallacious. (2) Is not true, and it does not follow from (1). 
Thus predictability may not be sufficient for testing. In some cases, the 
theory of evolution being the most famous, it may not even be necessary 
or possible to predict in order to validate the theory. 
Furthermore, Friedman is only willing to consider hypotheses that 
conform to the unstated (but implied by his examples) constraints that 
exclude many contenders for causal comparison. Such comparisons are 
necessary especially when new alternatives are presented in any science. 
Darwin's arguments about origins of species, Newton's mechanical theory 
of gravitational force and the kinetic-molecular theories all engaged in 
such comparisons for a protracted period and were finally declared  to be 
the better alternatives. In economics neoclassical economics is entrenched 
in an uncontested position largely as a sociology of science phenomenon, 
not because of an ability to furnish better  causal mechanisms compared 
to those of all serious contenders, or because of better ability to predict. 
Finally, Friedman's influence has also discouraged economists from 
asking ontological questions. In fact through the escape clause "as if" it 
has permitted the economists to act in good faith and ignore crucial 
ontological questions regarding the status of key theoretical entities. Thus 
the Canadian philosopher Maurice Lagueux correctly points out: 
 
 
Friedman's methodological attitude was effective in legitimizing 
economists' refusal to raise cumbersome questions about the 
character of the world they were analyzing, but such a systematic 
flight from ontological questions could hardly satisfy everybody in 
the profession for very long. Consequently, in the last decades, 
various attempts were made to anchor this theory in a more concrete 
world. The recent revival of sympathy for institutionalism was surely 
a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the purely formal approach to 
economics. However, in the context of a science rather inimical to 
sociologism, institutionalism is easily associated with the 
psychological analysis of behavior. Thus, with researchers like 
Herbert Simon, the analysis of beliefs and goals came back in the 
foreground; but this analysis was developed in the institutionalized 
context of bounded rationality. There is no doubt that such analyses 
are not of an ontological character, but they do go a long way toward 
bridging the gap left by Neoclassicals between economic analysis 
and the psychological entities which are supposed to play the role of 
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the exchangers in mathematical models.11 
 
 
The thrust of the argument so far has been to show that Friedman's 
practice in the methodology piece itself is too narrow. Wider comparisons 
on the basis of the causal structure of explanations could overcome this 
difficulty. Although in the methodology piece itself Friedman holds to a 
'prediction only' point of view, there is textual evidence from Friedman's 
own substantive scientific work that he has at least at times a causal 
approach. Thus there is at least some inconsistency between his preaching 
in the methodology essay and his scientific practice. Friedman's own 
attempts at causal explanation are far from trivial or oversights on his part. 
Kevin Hoover has argued that in spite of his methodological stance and his 
reluctance to use causal language, Friedman's best scientific work does 
invoke causal mechanisms at crucial points in his explanatory frameworks. 
One example is the velocity of money which plays a significant causal role, 
in this view, in Friedman's monetarist theory. Another example is the 
theory of permanent income. According to Hoover, 
 
 
Permanent income provides another – and perhaps more 
compelling – example. 
Like velocity, permanent income is not directly observable, but 
is indirectly measured and validated in the context of the 
consumption function. Permanent income is not only a causally 
significant category in this context, but Friedman regards it as 
sufficiently freestanding and independent of its original context, 
that he routinely uses the measured quantity in other contexts. For 
example, Friedman takes permanent income to be a causal 
determinant of the demand for money (i.e., permanent velocity = 
permanent income/money).12 
 
 
One could multiply such examples drawing upon Friedman's 
treatment of the role of information, his invocation of 'the natural rate of 
unemployment' and other features in his explanatory schemes of various 
macroeconomic phenomena. Therefore, Friedman's own practice 
illustrates the key role causality plays in our efforts at explaining. If one 
accepts this proposition and takes causal explanations seriously, then from 
hereon, the argument for causal comparisons is really an argument for 
scientific tolerance within the limits of reasonableness. 
At this point, the question may legitimately be raised as to what a fair 
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 Lagueux (undated), p.14 
12
 Hoover (2004), p. 11 
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causal comparison could be like and ask for some detailed examples. 
Fortunately, many examples are available from the history of physical and 
biological sciences. Richard Miller(1987) cites several of these. I have 
chosen his example from Darwin because it is particularly lucid and 
requires no mathematical background to understand it fully. 
As Miller reminds us,   
Good arguers are only as explicit as they have to be, given actual dangers of 
question-begging and confusion. One would expect the underlying nature of 
confirmation to be most explicit when the dangers of evasion and confusion are at 
their highest because an investigator is defending a novel hypothesis or seeking to 
resolve in a novel way an issue that has divided scientists into different schools of 
thought. In fact, it is at these junctures that the surface facts of argument best 
illustrate the idea that confirmation is causal comparison13 
. 
He then goes on to quote the famous passage from Darwin where he 
reasons about his theory and the most important alternative. His argument 
about bats is, as Miller correctly states,"… especially elegant, but 
otherwise typical example of Darwin's reasoning from his data:" 
 
 
 
 
I have carefully searched the oldest voyages, but have not finished my search; as yet, 
I have not found a single instance, free from doubt, of a terrestrial mammal 
(excluding domesticated animals kept by the natives) inhabiting an island situated 
above 300 miles from a continent or great continental island; and many islands 
situated at a much less distance are equally barren. . . . 
Though terrestrial mammals do not occur on oceanic islands, aerial mammals do 
occur on almost every island. New Zealand possesses two bats found nowhere else 
in the world: Norfolk Island, the Viti Archipelago, the Bonin Islands, the Caroline 
and Marianne Archipelagoes, and Mauritius, all possess their peculiar bats. Why, it 
may be asked, has the supposed creative force produced bats but no other mammals 
on remote islands? On my view this question can be easily answered: for no 
terrestrial mammal can be transported across a wide space of sea, but bats can fly 
across. [More specifically, bat transport occurs to provide a basis for speciation 
through natural selection, but occurs so infrequently that variants on remote islands 
are not overwhelmed by migrants from the more competitive mainland.]14 
 
It is important to emphasize here that Darwin is engaging in a particularly 
significant type of causal comparison in this example. As Miller points 
out: 
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 Miller(1987) p.164 
14
 Quoted from The Origin of Species in Miller(1987) p. 164 
 14 
Here as throughout the book, Darwin is comparing his favored hypothesis of 
speciation through natural selection not with the mere supposition of its 
falsehood but with rival hypotheses about the factors at work in the 
phenomena. The existence of islands with terrain hospitable to terrestrial 
mammals lacking such endemic species is important because the main rival is 
the hypothesis, dominant among the best-informed secular-minded scientists 
of the time, that species are created, without ancestors, by a force that makes 
them well-adapted to their environments. Also, Darwin makes his argument 
on the basis of principles he shares with the other side, for example, the shared 
principle that offspring are like their parents but subject to small variations, 
not the tendentiously anti-creationist, though plausible principle that a 
complex organism must be the offspring of another. Finally, Darwin is not 
claiming to have a complete explanation of the phenomena in question, although 
he certainly thinks that the complete answer would entail the approximate truth of 
his natural-selection hypothesis. Elsewhere, he makes it clear both that the 
mechanisms of heredity and variation are mysterious to him and that there is no 
way of predicting how an observed advantage will affect the actual course of 
speciation. The issue for him is whether the best available account of the data, 
however vague or incomplete, entails the superiority of the natural selection 
hypothesis over its current rivals.15 
 
   This type of argumentation is also common in physics when the 
contest among rival theories demands causally explicit comparisons. An 
example is Newton's contrast of the causal mechanisms in  his celestial 
mechanics with rival accounts such as Cartesian vortex theories and Tycho 
Brahe's system. His discussion of comets in his summary pamphlet, " The 
System of the World", makes this clear. Indeed, comets are most 
appropriate for the purpose of causal comparison in this context. All the 
rival theories in this example share the principles of geometric optics. By 
using these non-controversial shared principles Newton could derive 
important features of the orbits of comets. Once these orbits are derived 
mathematically, it then can be argued that the Ptolemaic celestial spheres 
found in Brahe's descriptive geocentric theory can not really exist. For if 
they did, then surely comets would collide against them. Likewise, the 
Cartesian vortices can not be the agents that move the planets and other 
celestial bodies. Newton observes that comets follow a dynamic trajectory 
through all parts of the sky which is inconsistent with the dynamics 
resulting from a vortex. 
  One could easily multiply such examples from the mature sciences. I 
hope the above examples demonstrate the need for taking rival theories 
seriously and for establishing alternative causal mechanisms which can be 
examined by using techniques of observation and logical procedures 
which are accepted as fair by all sides. It should also be noted that this is 
                                                       
15
 Miller (1987) pp.164-65. 
 15 
not simply a plea for mainstream theorists to take seriously the causal 
mechanisms postulated by the non-mainstream theories. The argument is 
symmetric. In fact, there are grounds for stressing that the challengers to 
the mainstream theories need to spell out the causal mechanisms of both 
their own alternative theories and the rival mainstream theories as well as 
the shared principles among these alternatives.  Much dogmatism in 
social sciences can be avoided if rival theorists were to make explicit the 
causal mechanisms and the grounds for what would comprise a fair causal 
comparison among rival theories. Of course, even after clarifying shared 
principles, there will be substantive areas of disagreement among 
contending theories. However, in this instance at least, the discussion of 
substantive disagreements and their possible resolution can proceed 
without talking at cross-purposes.There are more difficult cases where the 
framework principles themselves are in dispute.For such cases, it is 
necessary to develop a detailed theory of confirmation that would rely on 
topic-specific rules within a field or sub-field of inquiry rather than some 
global a priori or deductivist general rule ( for example, the failed logical 
positivist attempt to offer such global rules of confirmation for all 
sciences). While such a theory of confirmation for economics is yet to be 
fully developed, the approach defended here would call for a consideration 
of specific debates in substantive areas in order to develop such specific 
principles of confirmation. In particular, the demands for causal depth in 
specific theories would have to play a critical role in developing these 
topic-specific principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion: the need for open-minded causal comparisons 
 
The conclusion that we are led towards by considering the logical, 
ontological and sociological issues involved in Friedman's methodology is 
that an open-minded and tolerant approach to multiple contenders for "the 
most approximately true" explanatory framework for any given social 
science phenomenon ( or a set of such phenomena) is essential for 
progress in these sciences. Friedman's plea for being more aware of 
methodological issues in the social sciences is well taken. However, his 
seeming lack of awareness of the many serious contenders aside from 
neoclassical theory in his own field exposes a serious weakness in his 
approach. The idea of following a two step procedure where all or almost 
all contenders are allowed in the first stage as possible explanans 
candidates is to overcome this narrowness. But this still leaves us with a 
serious issue to resolve at the next stage, namely, confirming which one of 
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the contenders is most nearly a true explanation. 
Here, I have argued for a tolerant scientific realism which will 
proceed through causal comparisons. While the first stage in my suggested 
alternative methodology is quite permissive and open-minded, this second 
stage of causal comparisons will need to be truly rigorous given the 
standards of the particular field in question at the time of comparison. The 
role of auxiliary principles relating to issues such as instrumental 
reliability, the reliability and usefulness of historical as well as statistical 
and other methods in the social sciences is particularly important here. 
While it was not the intent of this note to develop an alternative theory of 
confirmation for the social sciences, enough has been said about the 
narrowness of Friedman's anti-realism and his exclusive focus on 
prediction to suggest that rigorous causal comparisons will allow 
comparisons at several levels including the assessment of the realism (or 
more precisely, the ontological status16) of theoretical entities along with 
explanatory and predictive successes of alternative theories.17 Spelling out 
these criteria further and illustrating them with examples from both the 
natural and the social sciences will be the task of a future paper. 
 
 
 
                                                       
16
 For helpful discussions by a philosopher, see Lageux (undated, 1994) 
17
 For a very helpful general philosophy of science discussion see Miller, op. cit. 
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